Years ago, I published: Carving up the philosophical terrain around personal identity a little differently. At the time, I thought it had gone essentially nowhere, but I recently saw someone refer to it, so I thought it might be nice to republish under a more catchy title.
A 2x2 matrix theory of personal survival over time (revisited)
Many people are aware that there is a debate between the psychological and bodily continuity theories of personal identity over time. I want to carve up the logical landscape in a way that introduces a second, fully independent axis, substantive vs pattern continuity.
According to the substantive view of personal identity, you survive if whatever object makes you up survives.
According to the pattern continuity view, you survive if the pattern that you consist of continues, even if that means destruction of the object that currently instantiates the pattern that makes up you, followed by its replacement with another object that continues that pattern.
The substantive view is often conflated with the bodily view, and the pattern view is often conflated with the psychological continuity view, but as we will see, they are conceptually independent. To demonstrate this, let’s consider two classic cases which, when considered jointly, none of the four possible combinations (bodily substantive, psychological substantive, psychological pattern, and bodily pattern) gives the same array of answers:
1. A brain transplant
If your brain is placed in a new body and your old body is destroyed, have you effectively “changed bodies”, or have you simply died? According to both psychological views of identity (pattern & substantive) you survive a brain transplant in which your initial body is discarded. According to both bodily views of identity (pattern & substantive), you do not, since you are constituted by your whole body, not just your brain. '
So far, we are in agreement with the standard account, which treats all psychological theories as pattern theories and all bodily theories as substance theories. But this agreement will not last.
2. Teleportation
If you are annihilated, then reconstructed elsewhere by a teletransporter, have you survived? Here’s where we diverge from the normal account. Teleportation is often thought to separate the bodily and psychological continuity theories of survival, with the psychological view contending that one survives teletransportation and the bodily view contending that one does not. '
Instead, in our taxonomy, what this case really separates is the pattern and substantive axis of views on personal identity. According to both pattern views of identity (bodily and psychological) you survive teleportation. In both cases, the pattern or arrangement that, according to these views, consists in who you are, is continued, since the pattern of both body and mind is recreated. Also, in both cases, the substance of what you are (either the actual mental states instantiated in the brain or the whole body) is destroyed, so both substantive views (bodily & psychological) rule that this is a case of death. Thus, we see that the four possible combinations of views in our taxonomy are logically distinct, because none of them gives the same answers as another to both cases above. The bodily substantive theory holds that one survives in none of these cases, the psychological substantive theory holds that one survives in the case of a brain transplant, but not teleportation, the bodily pattern theory holds that one survives in the case of teleportation but not a brain transplant and the psychological pattern theory holds that one survives in both cases.
My wholly unoriginal conclusions
Having presented my somewhat original taxonomy, let me give my wholly unoriginal conclusion.
For myself, contemplating the range of possibilities tends to strengthen within me the conviction that whether or not one “survives” or does not is, in many cases, something of an arbitrary conceptual choice. Like many, many philosophers who’ve thought about personal identity, I tend to think that recognition of the somewhat arbitrary and conventional nature of the whole thing is a far more important point than deciding which view best survives the gamut of intuitions. Also, like many philosophers (e.g. Parfit) I think this sense of open texture frees us up to think about what we really care about- treating survival as somewhat secondary. When we do so, what seems to matter most is our outlook, projects, sentimentalities, etc., and on this view, we’re best off picking the psychological pattern view.
Ancient Buddhism has the last word
King Milinda: “You are called ‘Nagasena.’ What is this ‘Nagasena’?
Is it the hair, the skin, the flesh, the blood, or the bones?”
Venerable Nagasena: “No, great king. ‘Nagasena’ is not the hair, skin, flesh, blood, or bones. Nor is it the mind-states, feelings, perceptions, dispositions, or consciousness taken singly.
“Suppose, sire, a chariot* were standing here. Asked, ‘What is the chariot?’ you would not say it is the axle, or the wheel-rim, or the yoke-pole. Yet, when the axle, wheels, frame, yoke, reins, and other parts are arranged in a certain way, the convenient designation ‘chariot’ is used.
“Just so, what is called ‘Nagasena’ is only a conventional name for the five aggregates of matter, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, arising and passing in dependence on causes. There is no permanent self hidden behind them; there is only a causal process.”
Hearing this, the king exclaimed:
“Wonderful, Venerable Nagasena, wonderful! It is like something overturned has been set upright. Henceforth I shall use ‘Nagasena’ merely as a name, following common practice, while understanding that in ultimate truth no person can be found.”
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I feel like this conversation stumbles over a "can you step in the same river twice?" problem. Answering the question of whether one is "the same person" after a major change is difficult, and is perhaps something more like a spectrum than a binary. Am I same the person I was ten minutes ago? My mind wants to believe so. Am I the same person as I was thirty years ago? Harder to say. I can't even claim to have all the same memories as that person. Things have been lost, and probably some portion of what I "remember" is in fact imagined. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the self is being recreated, continuously, from moment to moment, with imperfect fidelity. We are not truly the same, even after a few seconds. We are just _very similar_ to who we were a minute before.
I struggle with the question of whether the psychological patternist should agree that after a brain transplant, we are talking about "the same person". Perhaps the set of memories and beliefs and desires transfers... But there is a good deal of "embodied cognition". To take a trivial example, one might remember loving durian fruit before the transplant, but discover that one's new body is repulsed by it.
The whole body matters to the question of "identity". I think it is often good for us to embrace the continuity -- sometimes literally, as the widely-circulated Kor meme illustrates ( https://www.reddit.com/r/traaaaaaannnnnnnnnns/comments/q9o9ac/throwback_to_when_star_trek_did_trans_acceptance/ ). But on the other hand there are those who are more comfortable with the idea that their old self is dead, and they're better off liberated from it.
The difference between the pattern view and substance view is interesting. But I'm long-since convinced of a pattern account of consciousness.
Agree with you about personal identity, but gave a special upvote just for the orca!