Fourteen questions about the philosophy of OCD
Cartesian doubt and OCD: Are people with OCD more likely to experience Cartesian doubt about ordinary propositions that most people can scarcely doubt at all? Does that make OCD sufferers “natural philosophers” in some sense? Just as some have theorized a historical link between religion and OCD, is it possible to theorize a historical link between philosophy and OCD?
The self: Are those with OCD less likely to think of the self as concrete, unified and/or enduring- as some have told me and as I have experienced for myself? What does this tell us about philosophical theories that minimize the solidity of the self? Are the natural instincts of those with OCD in some sense different or opposed to more healthy ways of denying the self? (The Anatta doctrine in Buddhism, Hume’s Bundle conception of the self).
Social epistemology: Even as individuals may lose track of reality as a result of OCD, the presence of OCD-like traits in the population may act as a valuable social-epistemological check. What is collectively epistemically beneficial may not be individually epistemically beneficial, and vice-versa. It may be useful to have a tincture of irrational, ineradicable doubt in the potion of social knowledge.
The value of OCD: many of the mental traits accompanying OCD may have value, for their bearer and others, yet OCD is, in the main, a terrible and destructive disease- how are we to understand an relate to that tension? While some have tried to argue in the case of autism, that “difference” is a better framework than “disorder”, in relation to OCD, this outlook might seem to some silly and Panglossian. Yet it can’t be denied that in certain contexts, some features associated with OCD are useful. How should we think about this?
Related to the preceding, the “Mental illness non-identity problem”: If I didn’t have OCD, I would be almost nothing like myself- I would, in effect, not exist. In what sense then can I be angry or disappointed about having lived my life with this severe illness, if I am glad to be alive? How to make sense of regret that I have spent so much of my life with OCD if, but for that, I wouldn’t exist? Is OCD more connected to identity than other mental illnesses?
Mental “perversity” and OCD: Sometimes OCD develops a kind of seeming quasi-agency- almost as if it is deliberately seeking to harm its bearer by targeting their weak spots. Psychoanalysis has traditionally grappled with such phenomenon through the theorization of a “shadow” or “death drive”, but non-psychoanalytic explanations are very possible. How does a drive toward self-destruction complicate philosophical ideas of agency, selfhood, perversity and so on? See my previous work on the development of fears as a process of ‘natural’ selection within the organism.
Moral uncertainty and OCD. Does OCD’s pathological uncertainty maybe throw light on the literature on moral uncertainty?
The epistemic value of feelings and OCD. A common claim is that we must “listen to our feelings” or “intuition” more and that our failure to do so represents a deep problem with the Enlightenment philosophical tradition. As anyone with OCD can attest, there can be profound danger in listening to one’s feelings/intuition uncritically. In what ways does OCD cast a critical light on the “listen to your feelings” tradition in pop philosophy? Might the problems of OCD help show us the way to more critically integrate feelings into epistemology?
The moral value (or disvalue) of guilt. it is often said that there is a deep narcissism about guilt- a deep self-obsession and a kind of dark self-soothing (“actually the fact that I feel guilty means I really am a good person”) OCD, phenomenologically, seems to provide some basis for thinking this is true, yet there does seem to be a kind of “innocence” about this OCD narcissism- a benign quality- can OCD help us understand better the relationship between guilt, narcissism and virtue?
OCD, fear of culpability, and #metoo: consider recent debates over historic sexual wrongs, etc, and the ways this has interacted specifically with OCD, pathological guilt, and a pathological fear of shame. #Metoo is a phenomenon that many OCD sufferers have commented on online through the lens of their illness, in some cases not only stating that metoo has triggered them, but also arguing OCD gives them a vantage point from which to criticize perceived excesses of metoo as harsh or as similar in some respect to scrupulosity. Some articles in the popular media have addressed the link with various takes and perspectives. What is there to say about this? Does OCD cast a critical light on #metoo? Alternatively, and equally fascinating: does #metoo cast a critical light on OCD? Both? Neither?
OCD and belief- there’s an existing philosophical literature on whether people with OCD believe their OCD mentations that still needs to be resolved. In my experience, the answer is surely ‘sometimes’ and ‘sometimes not’. If the same sort of thing (an OCD mentation) can slide out of being believed and not believed, might that not have profound consequences for how we understand the category of belief?
An eminent psychologist once suggested to me that OCD bears a certain similarity to psychosis. What are the similarities between OCD and psychosis, relative to other anxiety disorders? How might we conceptualize this in terms of the philosophical literature on psychosis?
The concept of the sacred and OCD: Is there perhaps a deep connection between OCD and the idea of the sacred? Can we think of the sacred as that which is in perpetual danger of violation? The “impossible fragility” the OCD sufferer sees in the world- particularly in the things they value- seems to me to echo certain ideas of sacredness.
The philosophic nature of love and relationship OCD. How does the uncertainty of relationship OCD interact with traditional accounts of love and self-knowledge? What about the relationship between faith and scrupulosity? Should the felt uncertainty move us away from more sentimental accounts of love, towards accounts of love focused on preferences and beliefs revealed in action (e.g., self-sacrifice)?