Inadmissable knowledge: Introducing a concept

Suppose you run an important NGO, and Nathaniel, who has a superb CV, has applied for a role. In addition to having viewed his CV you know one and only one other thing about Nathaniel, you happen to remember having read in the paper that his dad is a murderer- the story named the murderer and mentioned his son, though didn’t give any other relevant information. This knowledge gives you some degree of evidence that Nathaniel might not be a good employee. However, it would be deeply wrong to consider this fact in making your determination about whether or not to hire Nathaniel- this knowledge is wholly inadmissible.

I think this is an interesting and under-discussed phenomenon- sometimes we know things that are potentially relevant, but it would be unethical to consider them, particularly in ways that might adversely affect the person who the knowledge pertains to. I call this the phenomenon of inadmissible knowledge.

The phenomenon is endlessly flexible- the same bit of information that is inadmissible in one context can become admissible in another context depending on the balance of tradeoffs between possible harms. Suppose someone is prosecuted for a violent crime or a sex crime and found not guilty. Let’s say you don’t know any more about the situation than that. In my view, it would be unethical to deny them a job. I know some people will disagree, but I don’t think stochastically making life difficult for those who may have committed crimes is just. If nothing else, everybody has got to work [frankly, even people who definitely have committed horrid crimes]. However, I, and I think most people, wouldn’t begrudge someone who tactfully refused to hire this person as a babysitter for their kids.

An interesting feature of inadmissible knowledge is that it usually creates an obligation to act tactfully where there is an exception to inadmissability. When you do apply knowledge that would be inadmissible in some situations, you are often obliged to be as cautious, kind, and subtle as possible.

I’m using crime as an example, but I’m thinking of a few really sad cases as I write this that didn’t involve crime, but where a person looked quite sus, yet it would be horrid to acknowledge that, even less act readily on that assumption. I won’t spell out those cases in detail, precisely because I do not want to risk bringing shame on anyone, but trust me when I say that in most people’s estimation, they had the features I describe.

When people talk about stereotypes as a problem, sometimes they seem to think of them as inadmissible knowledge, and sometimes they seem to think of them as just false. Doubtless, the reality depends on what kind of stereotype we’re talking about. Suppose I meet a white Southerner. Statistically, they’re more likely to hold racist beliefs like opposition to interracial marriage than a white northerner, but treating them differently to a white northerner, for this reason, would be inadmissible knowledge, at least in my view.

I’m fascinated by this idea of inadmissible knowledge. I’m also fascinated that I’ve never in my life heard it discussed openly outside of a legal context, even though most people seem to subscribe to the idea in at least some non-legal cases. I’m also fascinated by the ethical variance around inadmissible knowledge- some people, including myself, seem to think it is quite common, whereas others are opposed to the idea in a great many cases.

The fundamental ethical problems of inadmissible knowledge are:

1. When does it exist, if ever?

2. And when it does exist, what are its exceptions, if any?

I tend to favor a consequentialist framework for answering both questions, albeit a farsighted consequentialism that considers the global consequences and the possibility of your behavior reinforcing and weakening norms.