On Palestinian figures, an absolute minimum estimate is that 72% of those killed in Gaza have been non-combatants

The age distribution of deaths in the recent conflict, according to the Gazan Ministry of Health figures, is:

There is a small ‘bump’ around the combatant-aged region between the years of about 18 and 35, but only a small one. This is fairly consistent with the overall population distribution of ages:

What all this suggests is that the people dying in Gaza are frighteningly close to a random sample of the population by age, rather than focusing on prime combatant ages. This suggests that most of the deaths are civilians. I repeat: attacks that are killing mostly combatants do not create casualty statistics that look anything like the age pyramid for the population as a whole.

In this piece, I will argue that if the Gazan Ministry of Health figures are right, at least 72% of those who have died are civilians, and if you put a gun to my head, my guess for the true figure would be between 80-90%, and closer to the higher end of that range.

My data came from this spreadsheet helpfully prepared by the Iraq Body Count Project, relying on figures from the Gazan Ministry of Health, which is controlled by Hamas (although see this Reuters article for caveats in that statement). This brings us to the question of reliability.

The reliability of the figures

There are doubts about the reliability of the casualty figures. One can see the argument: Hamas who controls the Gazan government and health ministry has every reason to lie except one- if they lie, and are caught, that reduces the power of what they say in the future.

I am however inclined to think the figures are broadly accurate on the following grounds:

1. The figures are used by humanitarian agencies, some of which have investigated them, and trust them.

2. Reading between the lines, it looks like the Western press tends to trust these figures as well. See also this.

3. The figures are used by the US government in reports, despite recent complaints about by the US government about these figures.

4. The track record of the figures over the years seems good.

5. Finally, the scale and indiscriminate nature of the destruction indicated is compatible with the satellite images we have. From the air, the destruction does not seem at all pinpointed.

I would also add if the Israeli government didn’t want us to rely on these figures, perhaps they shouldn’t have created conditions that give us few alternatives. This might seem like a below-the-belt kick, but I mean it quite seriously. If the imposition of your power is, in large part responsible for the difficulty in obtaining figures about how much damage you’re doing- if you’ve, among other things, systematically cut off all access to the internet- you don’t get to complain much if people use the figures that are available. That said, I think the figures are probably good.

The 72 percent lower bound

I arrived at this figure by taking the number of men between the ages of 18 and 59 (inclusive). E.g., I assumed that all and only men of at least 18 years old, and less than 60 years old, were combatants. This still left 72% noncombatants.

Now, there are problems with this figure, some of which could bias it up, and some of which could bias it down. Problems that tend to indicate that it will be an underestimate are:

1. In theory, almost anyone can be a combatant. Children can be combatants. However, although children have received military training, they do not seem to be mobilized en masse from what I can tell. Men over 60 can be combatants, although it is not common. Women can be combatants, though from what I can tell this does not seem to be the rule in Gaza.

Problems that will tend to make the figure an overestimation:

1. Not all men between the ages of 18 and 60 are combatants, obviously. Most aren’t.

2. Even non-combatant men between these ages are more likely to be in high-risk areas e.g. due to jobs like ambulance driving, fire-fighting, and even working ordinary jobs.

It is my view that the heuristic of assuming every single male between the ages of 18 and 60 killed and no one else was a combatant will grossly underestimate the number of civilians killed, but it does provide a floor. That floor is 72%. My best estimate is something like 87% if these figures hold up. Even throwing in the possibility of friendly fire etc., it’s impossible for me to see how the figure can be below 80%. That is four to one civilian to military deaths.

Another thing to consider: There will be a long tail of excess deaths due to this conflict. There is no power. People will die of disease etc. People are going hungry and even when people do not directly die of malnutrition, it increases their risk of death.

This is all tentative, but I will say the following without trepidation: Either the figures are fabricated, or Israel is killing far more civilians than fighters. Criticism or comments on methodology are welcomed, and serious comments and criticism are gratefully received, as always. Comment moderation is fairly lax, but keep it civil, as always.