In no particular order
By accident
In a state of Automatism (sleepwalking, an epileptic fit etc.)
Under coercion
Due to different moral values.
Due to the absence of a moral value system at all, or at least a consistent one (psychopathy)
Due to mistakes or disagreements about the facts.
Due to emotional agitation or other disturbance.
Due to the misapplication of values in cases where the application of values is complex or there is little time.
Due to temptation and subsequent weakness of the will (non-moral incentives).
In cases where the capacity for reasoning, moral and otherwise, is absent or degraded in a way that makes it impossible - maybe even in principle- to disentangle which of the various factors listed above is crucial (e.g., a child trying to make complex moral decisions, moral decisionmaking in a state of advanced psychosis or dementia, or under the effect of powerful drugs etc.)
Due to the supersession of moral values by other types of values- e.g. religious, aesthetic or perhaps even political.
Idiopathically- sometimes a person will just do something, and it’s unclear, even to themselves, why on earth they did that.
Many cases will overlap. For example, consider the case of a person who is forced to commit some atrocity on pain of their life. This is a case of 2, but for many- who hold that the person should have been willing to die rather than commit such an act- it will also be a case of 3 and/or 8.
Cases 10 and 11 might need further clarification.
For an example of the tenth, consider a person who has such advanced psychosis that their speech is a word salad. In an agitated state, this person attacks someone. We cannot know whether it was a change in values, beliefs, emotions, etc. that caused this, but if we are even moderately Davidsonian, it is not even clear that there is a fact of the matter here because the system of belief-desire psychology of propositional attitudes may have broken down. I am not saying this is true, but we can’t rule it out.
For an example of the eleventh, consider someone who has converted to Christianity recently. Personally, they cannot see anything wrong with homosexuality, but believing the doctrines of their faith, they choose to prevent their children from spending time near a homosexual. They have acted wrongly in many people’s eyes, and in some sense it is due to a difference in values, but there’s a least a sense in which it’s not due to a difference in moral values. Granted, the distinction between moral values governing actions and other kinds of values seems tenuous, but it is worth at least considering.
Might want to add sheer contrariness--the non-moral, non-supersessionary desire to contravene the will of another (if one's a Hegelian, intrinsic to all subjectivity, but regardless patterned enough to not be idiopathic).
> For example, consider the case of a person who is forced to commit some atrocity on pain of their life. This is a case of 2, but for many- who hold that the person should have been willing to die rather than commit such an act- it will also be a case of 3 and/or 8.
I think these numbers are one too low; should be 3, 4, and 9 respectively.