Racism, "Prejudice plus power" and the semantics/pragmatics divide in language

The philosopher Jordan Scott has a new article out in Analysis in which he argues the “racism equals prejudice plus power” definition doesn’t work- as either a description of how we currently use the term racism, or as a proposal to redefine it in order to better combat racism.

There are aspects of the article I’d quibble with. For example, the author argues that is a black mark against the P+P definition that it can’t explain how members of racial minorities can be racist against each other.it is my impression that the “Prejudice plus power” definition was never intended to rule out the possibility of racial minorities being racist against other racial minorities- merely the possibility of any one being racist against white people. I think the prejudice plus power definition would handle cases of inter-minority prejudice by saying that when racial minorities express prejudice against other racial minorities they are in some sense aligned with the direction of overall social power (pushing down minorities) even though they do not inhabit a position of power themselves.

In general though, I agree with the author that the “prejudice plus power” definition was never very good. I think the idea expresses a strange essentialism about definitions that our contemporary understanding of how language functions isn't compatible with. I also agree with Scott that ultimately the ‘draw’ for the P+P theory is that racism against whites is just much less significant than other forms of racism.

However, I want to suggest a different approach to understanding what the P+P definition essentially getting at, one that I think somewhat more fully captures the issue of significance. In particular, I don’t think the core motivation for the P+P view ever really a claim about the meaning of racism or even what the meaning should be. It’s a claim about the ideological function of discourse, viz:

Almost all talk of anti-white racism serves analytically to obscure, and politically to shield elites.

There might be the odd exception to this claim. In the exceedingly rare case that someone is beaten up for being white for example, it would be silly to begrudge that person the right to call their attackers “racist”, at least in a personal sense. But what 99% of complaints about antiwhite racism do is derail and distract from a system of racial power and oppression.

By paying attention to the ideological dimensions of language, philosophers can avoid over semanticising issues much in the same way Grice cautioned us against over semanticising the pragmatics of language.

The ideological function of this language, and the need to separate pragmatics from semantics a la Grice

Scott begins by talking about the distinction between personal and structural racism. He says that his paper is solely concerned with personal racism. However, I think in order to understand the issue best, we have to focus on their interactions. I want to make the following claims:

Overwhelmingly, the kinds of personal racism that actually matter are aligned with structural racism- the danger of personal racism is that it works in tandem with structural racism

There is no structural racism against white people in America

Ergo personal racism against white people is not particularly significant at least at the scale of society as a whole

The majority of claims of anti-white racism, and even more so the tremendous majority of claims of anti-white racism made on a national platform, are, consciously or otherwise, crafted to distract from racism against oppressed racial groups

What I am proposing, in effect, is to replace a definitional theory that racism = prejudice + power, with an empirical and normative theory about the ideological function of the vast majority of discussions of “anti-white racism”, and about the tie between significant instances of personal and structural racism. To put it differently- to replace a claim about semantics with a claim about pragmatics. Rather than try to rule anything out by definition, we pay attention to the discursive strategies that talking about certain sorts of issues rather than others reveal, and the ways personal prejudice and structural power disparities interact.

Grice explained how philosophers were too quick to draw inferences from how we use words to what words mean- ignoring the complex interaction between pragmatics and a semantics. In effect, what I am saying can be seen as an extension of Grice’s point- the reason why discussion of anti-white racism is very nearly always wrong doesn’t have to be semantic, it can be pragmatic. In particular, I would urge philosophers studying socially sensitive issues to look not just at the local pragmatics but to consider also the global pragmatics - or perhaps more accurately the political pragmatics of language.

Why was there an attempt to define it like that then?

So why did people turn to the “racism equals prejudice plus power” definition in the first place, if Scott is right and it doesn’t really work?

I think that, most, though not all, Americans, especially white Americans, aren’t used to talking about social structure, particularly social structure as it interacts with complex normative claims about structural, legal, economic and cultural justice. “Racism just means prejudice plus power” was an attempt to substitute for complex and nuanced discussions about, how, very often, talking about anti-white racism is an attempt to crowd out discussion of racism directed against people of color. “That’s wrong, racism doesn’t mean that” is an attempt to shut down certain discursive moves which often need to be shut down.

One of the more controversial things I want to say about this is that I think there is some value to conceding that, on the odd occasion, anyone might be a victim of personal racism- even if it is unlikely. Why? Because it gives everyone a kind of personal investment- however small- in the concept of racism, and in the idea that racial prejudice is a bad thing. Several writers on political economy have suggested that giving the whole electorate entitlements to certain rights and entitlements, even rights they for the most part don’t really need, makes them more eager to defend them. The right to be insulated from racism becomes part of an individual’s entitlements, and thus they grow to value it more. It may also encourage a sense of solidarity to see an entitlement you perceive yourself as holding being breached in someone else’s case.

Bears of all colors united against racism