TLDR: analysis of Oryx figures suggest Ukrainian figures are accurate, at least since the start of March. This is bad news for Russia. I hazard a prediction that if this rate of equipment loss up for another 60 days the Russians will probably need to get out, and if this keeps up for 90 days the Russians will very probably have to get out.
Can you explain your reasoning? The internet says Russia has 12400 tanks, so it would seem like only a very small fraction of the total are being destroyed. You think that after several hundred more they'll be forced to withdraw?
I have not counted, but Wikipedia has a list breaking down how many are in "active service" and how many are "in reserve". Given what we have seen so far from the Russian military in terms of maintenance, my guess is that the great majority of equipment that is "in reserve" is in an unusable state and would have to be overhauled first. Even the equipment in active service is probably not 100% usable. In general, I think this analysis is conservative. In recent days, Russian losses have started to include older equipment indicating that they are starting to struggle to replace their losses at the same quality.
Note: the loss of trained, experienced crews is probably of greater significance than tank losses per se. Typically all or most crew members would be killed or wounded in a tank hit by modern anti-tank rockets or large caliber artillery. If tanks destroyed were about 100, KIA and WIA would be close to 300.
In brief, Russia has 2,800 T-55, 2,500 T-62, and 2,000 T-64 obsolete, non-operational tanks in storage. The pre-Ukraine invasion "12,500" oft-quoted number breaks down as follows: 450 T-80s in active service and 3,000 in reserve, 350 T-90As in active service and 200 in reserve. 1,900 T-72s in service and 7,000 in reserve, some number of which are upgraded to modern standards.
Tanks are costly high-maintenance machines. They require constant maintenance while in reserve, which doesn't seem to be happening.
3,000 would be a correct number for tanks in service, except it is highly likely that many are in disrepair and are not readily deployable. The apparently high breakdown rate of the tanks in Ukraine testify to Russia's poor maintenance practices. It looks like as many as half of Russia's losses have been breakdowns.
I think, therefore, that a reasonable estimate of Russia's pre-invasion operational inventory would be between 900 and 1,500 tanks. Given that many of these tanks are positioned in areas remote from Ukraine for defensive ourposes and are not availsble for deployment, losses of 200 to 400 of these tanks would be significant. At the low end, that is a loss of about 14%; on the high end about 45%; the median loss about 25%. From the Russian point of view, any of those percentages would be troublesome.
2 Factors make ORYX data difficult to track: [1] their data is presented in raw (analog) format, and [2] because their data is overwritten multiple times a day, historical data is erased which makes equipment loss trend lines invisible. I know of only 1 website that makes equipment trend lines visible: https://www.engineereddata.com/go-ukraine.html
I do agree that Russian losses are substantial. However, I think they are lower than your and the Ukrainian estimate given here.
1. The majority of lost ground equipment documented on Oryx are from captured and abandoned vehicles. I think for these a lower than 1 multiplier should be used to adjust for the possibility of these being retaken. I suspect that these vehicles are in areas mostly controlled by the invading Russian forces, and they were left in a lot of cases only temporarily by intention (meaning: due to mechanical breakdown/lack of fuel the crew abandoned them, expecting and the maintenance companies are to recover them later; crew is sleeping/cooking in nearby locations etc.), or even in case the crew deserted, patrolling or incoming fresh Russian units may recover them.
2. There is very large discrepancy between Oryx and Ukrainian sources regarding air assets. It is difficult to indentify flying objects, but the flames and smoke of crashed helicopters or airplanes are visible from pretty far away. I suspect most of the reported losses are from overly optimistic ground to air missile operators, who thought they shot down a Russian jet, but actually they missed, or only destroyed a drone or a missile. Hence, I think for these we should assume Oryx is much more accurate.
Very interesting. Do you plan on doing that calculation on Ukrainian losses and how long they can keep up. Given that they have significantly less tanks and equipment in general.
I haven't seen any statistics I trust on how Ukrainian equipment loss. All available figures are likely underestimates. If we trusted available figures from Oryx (and I don't!) this war has has been a net equipment gain for Ukraine.
That's why I framed this as an estimate of how long the Russians can keep up *conditional on their equipment loss continuing unabated at the same rate it is now*. Makes the issue of Ukrainian equipment loss irrelevant.
I'll just add as well that *even if* I had good figures for equipment loss for Ukraine, it would be hard to use them because 1. The Ukrainians are stealing a lot of stuff from the Russians and 2. The Ukrainians are getting equipment shipped in by NATO.
I think losses of vehicles on the Ukrainian side should be approximately the same as on the Russian side. We just don't see them due to Russian troops not having the means to document them (they are not allowed to carry mobile phones during the operation) and Ukrainians not sharing them eagerly. As a proportion of armored vehicles lost to vehicles in inventory they are probably in a worse situation. But this is to be expected, as Russians were much better equipped and trained for maneuver warfare.
That being said, this is not really a significant issue, as Ukrainians are the defending force, controlling the territory until contested. They do not need armored forces to conquer territory; as long as there are people willing to fight, weapons that are good enough to destroy opposing forces (from which they have received a lot since the start of the conflict from western forces) and supplies to feed them, they can keep doing this.
Can you explain your reasoning? The internet says Russia has 12400 tanks, so it would seem like only a very small fraction of the total are being destroyed. You think that after several hundred more they'll be forced to withdraw?
1. A common estimate for the number of tanks that' are actually battle-worthy is something closer to about 3000
2. Based on the distribution of Brigade tactical groups one would be shocked if they had more than 1500 tanks in Ukraine.
Where did you get the 3,000 number from?
I have not counted, but Wikipedia has a list breaking down how many are in "active service" and how many are "in reserve". Given what we have seen so far from the Russian military in terms of maintenance, my guess is that the great majority of equipment that is "in reserve" is in an unusable state and would have to be overhauled first. Even the equipment in active service is probably not 100% usable. In general, I think this analysis is conservative. In recent days, Russian losses have started to include older equipment indicating that they are starting to struggle to replace their losses at the same quality.
where did wiki get that number from?
I've lost two attempts to comment. Trying again.
Note: the loss of trained, experienced crews is probably of greater significance than tank losses per se. Typically all or most crew members would be killed or wounded in a tank hit by modern anti-tank rockets or large caliber artillery. If tanks destroyed were about 100, KIA and WIA would be close to 300.
In brief, Russia has 2,800 T-55, 2,500 T-62, and 2,000 T-64 obsolete, non-operational tanks in storage. The pre-Ukraine invasion "12,500" oft-quoted number breaks down as follows: 450 T-80s in active service and 3,000 in reserve, 350 T-90As in active service and 200 in reserve. 1,900 T-72s in service and 7,000 in reserve, some number of which are upgraded to modern standards.
Tanks are costly high-maintenance machines. They require constant maintenance while in reserve, which doesn't seem to be happening.
3,000 would be a correct number for tanks in service, except it is highly likely that many are in disrepair and are not readily deployable. The apparently high breakdown rate of the tanks in Ukraine testify to Russia's poor maintenance practices. It looks like as many as half of Russia's losses have been breakdowns.
I think, therefore, that a reasonable estimate of Russia's pre-invasion operational inventory would be between 900 and 1,500 tanks. Given that many of these tanks are positioned in areas remote from Ukraine for defensive ourposes and are not availsble for deployment, losses of 200 to 400 of these tanks would be significant. At the low end, that is a loss of about 14%; on the high end about 45%; the median loss about 25%. From the Russian point of view, any of those percentages would be troublesome.
2 Factors make ORYX data difficult to track: [1] their data is presented in raw (analog) format, and [2] because their data is overwritten multiple times a day, historical data is erased which makes equipment loss trend lines invisible. I know of only 1 website that makes equipment trend lines visible: https://www.engineereddata.com/go-ukraine.html
I do agree that Russian losses are substantial. However, I think they are lower than your and the Ukrainian estimate given here.
1. The majority of lost ground equipment documented on Oryx are from captured and abandoned vehicles. I think for these a lower than 1 multiplier should be used to adjust for the possibility of these being retaken. I suspect that these vehicles are in areas mostly controlled by the invading Russian forces, and they were left in a lot of cases only temporarily by intention (meaning: due to mechanical breakdown/lack of fuel the crew abandoned them, expecting and the maintenance companies are to recover them later; crew is sleeping/cooking in nearby locations etc.), or even in case the crew deserted, patrolling or incoming fresh Russian units may recover them.
2. There is very large discrepancy between Oryx and Ukrainian sources regarding air assets. It is difficult to indentify flying objects, but the flames and smoke of crashed helicopters or airplanes are visible from pretty far away. I suspect most of the reported losses are from overly optimistic ground to air missile operators, who thought they shot down a Russian jet, but actually they missed, or only destroyed a drone or a missile. Hence, I think for these we should assume Oryx is much more accurate.
Very interesting. Do you plan on doing that calculation on Ukrainian losses and how long they can keep up. Given that they have significantly less tanks and equipment in general.
I haven't seen any statistics I trust on how Ukrainian equipment loss. All available figures are likely underestimates. If we trusted available figures from Oryx (and I don't!) this war has has been a net equipment gain for Ukraine.
That's why I framed this as an estimate of how long the Russians can keep up *conditional on their equipment loss continuing unabated at the same rate it is now*. Makes the issue of Ukrainian equipment loss irrelevant.
I'll just add as well that *even if* I had good figures for equipment loss for Ukraine, it would be hard to use them because 1. The Ukrainians are stealing a lot of stuff from the Russians and 2. The Ukrainians are getting equipment shipped in by NATO.
I think losses of vehicles on the Ukrainian side should be approximately the same as on the Russian side. We just don't see them due to Russian troops not having the means to document them (they are not allowed to carry mobile phones during the operation) and Ukrainians not sharing them eagerly. As a proportion of armored vehicles lost to vehicles in inventory they are probably in a worse situation. But this is to be expected, as Russians were much better equipped and trained for maneuver warfare.
That being said, this is not really a significant issue, as Ukrainians are the defending force, controlling the territory until contested. They do not need armored forces to conquer territory; as long as there are people willing to fight, weapons that are good enough to destroy opposing forces (from which they have received a lot since the start of the conflict from western forces) and supplies to feed them, they can keep doing this.
Interesting article. Excited to see how your conditional prediction turns out.