"I, in my bones, do not recognize legitimacy, I see the banner of law as, of at most, pragmatic interest. Sometimes that pragmatic interest is strong -- we should aim to avoid civil war and the idea of legitimacy helps with that."
This statement is making my head hurt.
Because on the one hand, I agree that it is clearly possible for the State to "legalize" unjust actions that a moral person has a duty to resist / impede. So we can't say that it's a universal rule that one should submit to "legitimate" (legally-sanctioned) force.
On the other hand, the idea that the concept of the State's monopoly on the acceptable use of violence is merely a pragmatic convenience... Like, I agree that it is not a "first principle", you have to derive it _from_ the more general problem of liberalism -- agreeing to all share the world and not kill each other any time we have a disagreement about religion, who wants what bit of land, etc. But, "it's better to settle our differences by way of courts and voting, rather than murdering each other" is pretty damn close to a first principle. At most it's one step removed, flowing _directly_ from the idea that life is valuable and killing each other is bad.
I think where I come down is that I _do_ believe in the distinction of legitimate vs illegitimate violence. I just don't believe that _mere process_ can be what grants the color of legitimacy. The process can be corrupted in a way that removes the legitimacy of the state. Even if Congress votes for a law that says Donald Trump can order the National Guard to shoot protestors, and six Justices say, "Yep, our twisted reading of the Constitution agrees," we are still within our rights to disagree, and to obstruct or even fight back; and the moral obligation of the Guardsmen in question is to refuse the order.
Or, to put it more elegantly:
We hold these truths to be self-evident:
--That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.
--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
--That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.
That said, I _do_ end up agreeing with your point that, basically, it is inconceivable that anyone could work as a health insurance CEO under the American system without being effectively guilty of causing unnecessary deaths. I'm uncertain whether the label "mass murderer" applies, but certainly "facilitator of mass death through indifference and greed". The fact that they can do what they do and still imagine themselves to be good people is astonishing. Compartmentalization at its finest. (I'm reminded of the portrayal of the Ushers in the recent Netflix series.)
From a utilitarian perspective, the big difference, vis a vis celebrating my death, is that me dying would be unlikely to improve anything- whereas the political impact here is more unclear.
From a more deontic perspective there a are a couple of different points at which we could pin the distinction, but big difference is that I *withhold* more charity than I should - an omission. However a CEO *actively rearranges the organizational policies to prevent it from giving away money, lobbies the government to avoid having to pay money, and performs many other classes of acts that create grievances.
It seems like the CEO’s responsibility for death also comes from omission, to the extent that’s a meaningful distinction. Like, let’s say Brian Thompson was a perfectly average health insurance company CEO. If he didn’t take any actions, then probably another average person would be CEO and the same number of people would die. By your argument, the reason he’s responsible for deaths is that he wasn’t actively altruistic by lying to his shareholders and minimizing deaths as much as possible, just like you’re not actively giving as much as you can to charity.
But Thompson has the fairly unique opportunity to do his particular job altruistically or not (while most people don't have whatever it takes to become a CEO), **as well as** give as much as he can to charity outside of that.
And he chooses neither option in consideration of the overall good. That's two strikes for him, and one strike for those of us who do not have the kind of job Thompson has.
And what are the implications of having two strikes versus one strike? Are you arguing that everyone gets one free strike, and you’re only morally responsible for any deaths caused by strikes after that? Or you’re responsible for all the deaths, but it only becomes acceptable to kill you after two strikes?
The implication is that some people are more morally responsible than others
However, I'm not sure when to spend resources on identifying a few of the "most responsible" and changing them vs. when to spend resources on changing large numbers of "swing voter"-like people
Yeah, I basically agree in that I think not donating as much as you can to GiveWell and not making altruistically optimal business decisions are the same kind of thing for this purpose, varying mostly in the magnitude of the effect. I just think it's not useful to describe that thing as "being morally responsible for deaths", if you also think it's okay to kill people who are morally responsible for deaths, because then it's okay to kill most people.
This sentance seems bizarre to me: "on the assumption that Brian Thompson denied more care at the margin than was necessary for his company to function ... what he did was, essentially, exactly the same as breaking into people’s houses and stealing medicine from their medicine cabinet, causing them to die. That is, in turn, more or less equivalent to shooting them to steal their wallets."
I completely fail to see how a company not being a charity is more or less equivalent to murder and theft. I could maybe see it if you felt that paying insurance gives you a legitimate property claim and denying a true claim is depriving you of your legitimate property and therefore theft - but I don't think you can view things that way.
"...considered in and of itself and without reference to effects on other things..." That's... not what deserves means, I think. Behavior affects dessert, right?
Nearly every time when people make a negative or critical statement about another's actions, it's because they themselves do it or fear that they do. I know it's similar, but I don't exactly mean that 'every accusation is a confession.' I suppose it's a close corollary, but on a smaller personal scale. Like any time I've wanted to talk shit about someone, if I pause for a moment of self-reflection, this seems to be the case, and I've noticed it in others too.
"I, in my bones, do not recognize legitimacy, I see the banner of law as, of at most, pragmatic interest. Sometimes that pragmatic interest is strong -- we should aim to avoid civil war and the idea of legitimacy helps with that."
This statement is making my head hurt.
Because on the one hand, I agree that it is clearly possible for the State to "legalize" unjust actions that a moral person has a duty to resist / impede. So we can't say that it's a universal rule that one should submit to "legitimate" (legally-sanctioned) force.
On the other hand, the idea that the concept of the State's monopoly on the acceptable use of violence is merely a pragmatic convenience... Like, I agree that it is not a "first principle", you have to derive it _from_ the more general problem of liberalism -- agreeing to all share the world and not kill each other any time we have a disagreement about religion, who wants what bit of land, etc. But, "it's better to settle our differences by way of courts and voting, rather than murdering each other" is pretty damn close to a first principle. At most it's one step removed, flowing _directly_ from the idea that life is valuable and killing each other is bad.
I think where I come down is that I _do_ believe in the distinction of legitimate vs illegitimate violence. I just don't believe that _mere process_ can be what grants the color of legitimacy. The process can be corrupted in a way that removes the legitimacy of the state. Even if Congress votes for a law that says Donald Trump can order the National Guard to shoot protestors, and six Justices say, "Yep, our twisted reading of the Constitution agrees," we are still within our rights to disagree, and to obstruct or even fight back; and the moral obligation of the Guardsmen in question is to refuse the order.
Or, to put it more elegantly:
We hold these truths to be self-evident:
--That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.
--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
--That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.
Got goosebumps reading the final paragraph
That said, I _do_ end up agreeing with your point that, basically, it is inconceivable that anyone could work as a health insurance CEO under the American system without being effectively guilty of causing unnecessary deaths. I'm uncertain whether the label "mass murderer" applies, but certainly "facilitator of mass death through indifference and greed". The fact that they can do what they do and still imagine themselves to be good people is astonishing. Compartmentalization at its finest. (I'm reminded of the portrayal of the Ushers in the recent Netflix series.)
Why aren't you responsible for deaths in the same way as Brian due to your choices not to donate the maximum amount of money you can?
This is an interesting question.
From a utilitarian perspective, the big difference, vis a vis celebrating my death, is that me dying would be unlikely to improve anything- whereas the political impact here is more unclear.
From a more deontic perspective there a are a couple of different points at which we could pin the distinction, but big difference is that I *withhold* more charity than I should - an omission. However a CEO *actively rearranges the organizational policies to prevent it from giving away money, lobbies the government to avoid having to pay money, and performs many other classes of acts that create grievances.
It seems like the CEO’s responsibility for death also comes from omission, to the extent that’s a meaningful distinction. Like, let’s say Brian Thompson was a perfectly average health insurance company CEO. If he didn’t take any actions, then probably another average person would be CEO and the same number of people would die. By your argument, the reason he’s responsible for deaths is that he wasn’t actively altruistic by lying to his shareholders and minimizing deaths as much as possible, just like you’re not actively giving as much as you can to charity.
But Thompson has the fairly unique opportunity to do his particular job altruistically or not (while most people don't have whatever it takes to become a CEO), **as well as** give as much as he can to charity outside of that.
And he chooses neither option in consideration of the overall good. That's two strikes for him, and one strike for those of us who do not have the kind of job Thompson has.
And what are the implications of having two strikes versus one strike? Are you arguing that everyone gets one free strike, and you’re only morally responsible for any deaths caused by strikes after that? Or you’re responsible for all the deaths, but it only becomes acceptable to kill you after two strikes?
The implication is that some people are more morally responsible than others
However, I'm not sure when to spend resources on identifying a few of the "most responsible" and changing them vs. when to spend resources on changing large numbers of "swing voter"-like people
Yeah, I basically agree in that I think not donating as much as you can to GiveWell and not making altruistically optimal business decisions are the same kind of thing for this purpose, varying mostly in the magnitude of the effect. I just think it's not useful to describe that thing as "being morally responsible for deaths", if you also think it's okay to kill people who are morally responsible for deaths, because then it's okay to kill most people.
This sentance seems bizarre to me: "on the assumption that Brian Thompson denied more care at the margin than was necessary for his company to function ... what he did was, essentially, exactly the same as breaking into people’s houses and stealing medicine from their medicine cabinet, causing them to die. That is, in turn, more or less equivalent to shooting them to steal their wallets."
I completely fail to see how a company not being a charity is more or less equivalent to murder and theft. I could maybe see it if you felt that paying insurance gives you a legitimate property claim and denying a true claim is depriving you of your legitimate property and therefore theft - but I don't think you can view things that way.
"...considered in and of itself and without reference to effects on other things..." That's... not what deserves means, I think. Behavior affects dessert, right?
Nearly every time when people make a negative or critical statement about another's actions, it's because they themselves do it or fear that they do. I know it's similar, but I don't exactly mean that 'every accusation is a confession.' I suppose it's a close corollary, but on a smaller personal scale. Like any time I've wanted to talk shit about someone, if I pause for a moment of self-reflection, this seems to be the case, and I've noticed it in others too.