Privacy advocates are wusses because they won’t talk about the best reason to oppose creeping surveillance: allowing people to get away with doing the wrong thing. Generally, when we’re listing the advantages of invading privacy, someone will say argue that it’s good because we’ll catch more wrongdoers. Extending work by Cressida Gauroger, I want to turn this around. I want to argue that the possibility of catching more wrongdoers is a reason not to engage in additional surveillance, at least in many cases.
Privacy also allows people to disobey what is "legal" but not "moral" or "ethical". (Not going to expand on those nebulous words because you are the philosophy bear, not me.) I'd like to hope that just because we have the ability to surveil everyone, and we currently do, and it is currently "accepted", does not mean it always will be.
Hm, but does this argument really work against surveillance per se or only against too high a prosecution rate?
Less surveillance biases who gets prosecuted in favor of smart, resourceful criminals who can hide their crimes. So additional privacy is a regressive tax in terms of prosecution. Wouldn't a "fairer" solution be to have total surveillance and then simply fix a prosecution rate and randomize who gets prosecuted (possibly weighted by the severity of the offense, disregarding other reasons not to have total surveillance, of course)?
Privacy also allows people to disobey what is "legal" but not "moral" or "ethical". (Not going to expand on those nebulous words because you are the philosophy bear, not me.) I'd like to hope that just because we have the ability to surveil everyone, and we currently do, and it is currently "accepted", does not mean it always will be.
Hm, but does this argument really work against surveillance per se or only against too high a prosecution rate?
Less surveillance biases who gets prosecuted in favor of smart, resourceful criminals who can hide their crimes. So additional privacy is a regressive tax in terms of prosecution. Wouldn't a "fairer" solution be to have total surveillance and then simply fix a prosecution rate and randomize who gets prosecuted (possibly weighted by the severity of the offense, disregarding other reasons not to have total surveillance, of course)?
I am surprised that Graukroger's list does not include a much more conventional consequentialist argument:
(5): Privacy protects us from being aribitrarily persecuted.
The argument here goes something like:
1. Everone has bad stuff hidden away.
2. Thus everyone could in principle be shamed or persecuted (or even prosecuted).
3. Resource-wise, It is only possible to persecute a fraction of bad deeds.
3. Who and what gets persecuted will likely be determined arbitrarily.
4. Thus in a world without privacy everyone is at risk of arbitrary persecution.
Brach = breach?