Moral realism has many senses, but call “practical moral realism” the view that there are moral consensuses for humans we can figure out and come to agree upon, which humans or most humans really rationally ought to accept, and some people right now are correct about them and others are wrong.
Moral realism is the idea that there are stance-independent moral facts. Moral anti-realists reject this, either because there are no moral facts, or because moral facts are stance-dependent. There doesn’t seem to be much discussion of stance dependence or independence in the post. Is the post inconsistent with a position that claims that moral facts are stance-dependent?
I suspect that moral realists and anti-realists face similar epistemic situations and practical choices. Both groups want to improve their understanding of moral facts. What is at stake in the debate?
> Moral realism has many senses, but call “practical moral realism” the view that there are moral consensuses for humans we can figure out and come to agree upon, which humans or most humans really rationally ought to accept, and some people right now are correct about them and others are wrong
I was disappointed that this post wasn't about meta-ethical realism. So wrote that post instead:
I think that it is about the truth or falsity of realism! Moral realism is) as you know moral realism is (infamously) a moving target in the literature, and is by this point something of a "I Know it when I see it". I've heard people describe simple subjectivism about morality as "moral realism" since it turns out there are moral facts and true and false propositions about them on this view. I think practical moral realism captures the 'feel' of it with features like- a (1) widely shared (2) domain of facts (3) that we are often both right and wrong about, (4) which our statements regarding are truth apt and that (5) that gives us reasons.
starts off well but then gets all nitty-griity at a minecraft level of resolution, crafting is still possible but the thickets of logical sense grow and ramify obscuring the goal (see comments of Davesnot here for some implications)
but that is all the 'worlding urge' gives us, and that is why we should should, among others and their kin— our good selves, ideally at least
(I used to call it a moral urge [beyond that, the details are up to us] but discovered that there is no moral domain, but still we have the urge to... organise the something-must-be-done _shouldiness_ of life, so now I call it the "worlding urge"
art/religion are other possible outcomes of the worlding urge
'worlding' being a type of 'selfing' without the ego/self in mind… usually for others, but...
I just don't think your convergence notion captures moral realism at all. Indeed, it seems to me like most versions of moral anti-realism are going to pass the test.
I'd argue that what's necessary for moral realism to be true is that if you met some aliens who said they had a notion of shmorals which had the same action guiding role for them moral claims do for moral realists (they feel they ought to do what is shmorally right) but which they claimed differed from what we think is moral they must be making a mistake about the world. If you are willing to say they aren't getting anything wrong but just talking about a different concept you are a moral anti-realist. (Berry has a paper about this...think it's probably not companions in guilt)
And I think that this illustrates how your test goes wrong. For instance, I find overall utility to be the thing I feel I should maximize. I don't need any extra property where I observe that it's morally correct as well and I think my ideal self would perfectly agree. But none of that means that someone who wanted to minimize utility and felt that was motivating is in any way making a mistake of fact. I'd obviously see them as horrible and try to stop them but that doesn't mean they've gotten anything wrong.
"Watching would-be Ubermenschian conservatives thump their chests about how it’s good the strong dominate the weak has sapped my confidence in ethical convergence tbqh. The starting principles seem quite different."
I can understand why you would feel that way, but I'm not sure if those conservatives do actually undermine the truth of practical moral realism: it seems to me that they are not so much asserting that it is morally good that the strong dominate the weak, but rather that they do not care about moral principles, that they reject moral reasoning for what they assert.
I think what's going on is more like that point in a marital fight where you are so hurt and upset you are willing to say whatever to avoid giving them a victory.
It's less that conservatives are rejecting morality but they feel -- like the unsophisticated theist defending themselves from the someone like Dawkins -- that this kind of talk and discussion is being used to screw them over and they realize they lack the resources to respond in kind. And that can often be the case. I remember in highschool courses feeling that certain subjects/concepts were being presented in a biased and unfair manner and you can get that sense long before you can articulate what is actually going on.
I'm not saying it's a good thing but it's understandable.
Two questions:
Moral realism is the idea that there are stance-independent moral facts. Moral anti-realists reject this, either because there are no moral facts, or because moral facts are stance-dependent. There doesn’t seem to be much discussion of stance dependence or independence in the post. Is the post inconsistent with a position that claims that moral facts are stance-dependent?
I suspect that moral realists and anti-realists face similar epistemic situations and practical choices. Both groups want to improve their understanding of moral facts. What is at stake in the debate?
> Moral realism has many senses, but call “practical moral realism” the view that there are moral consensuses for humans we can figure out and come to agree upon, which humans or most humans really rationally ought to accept, and some people right now are correct about them and others are wrong
I was disappointed that this post wasn't about meta-ethical realism. So wrote that post instead:
https://ariethoughts.substack.com/p/why-the-truth-or-falsity-of-moral
I think that it is about the truth or falsity of realism! Moral realism is) as you know moral realism is (infamously) a moving target in the literature, and is by this point something of a "I Know it when I see it". I've heard people describe simple subjectivism about morality as "moral realism" since it turns out there are moral facts and true and false propositions about them on this view. I think practical moral realism captures the 'feel' of it with features like- a (1) widely shared (2) domain of facts (3) that we are often both right and wrong about, (4) which our statements regarding are truth apt and that (5) that gives us reasons.
I feel like this post https://joecarlsmith.com/2021/06/21/on-the-limits-of-idealized-values is a relevant discussion of how fraught idealization is even for a single individual.
starts off well but then gets all nitty-griity at a minecraft level of resolution, crafting is still possible but the thickets of logical sense grow and ramify obscuring the goal (see comments of Davesnot here for some implications)
but that is all the 'worlding urge' gives us, and that is why we should should, among others and their kin— our good selves, ideally at least
(I used to call it a moral urge [beyond that, the details are up to us] but discovered that there is no moral domain, but still we have the urge to... organise the something-must-be-done _shouldiness_ of life, so now I call it the "worlding urge"
art/religion are other possible outcomes of the worlding urge
'worlding' being a type of 'selfing' without the ego/self in mind… usually for others, but...
I just don't think your convergence notion captures moral realism at all. Indeed, it seems to me like most versions of moral anti-realism are going to pass the test.
I'd argue that what's necessary for moral realism to be true is that if you met some aliens who said they had a notion of shmorals which had the same action guiding role for them moral claims do for moral realists (they feel they ought to do what is shmorally right) but which they claimed differed from what we think is moral they must be making a mistake about the world. If you are willing to say they aren't getting anything wrong but just talking about a different concept you are a moral anti-realist. (Berry has a paper about this...think it's probably not companions in guilt)
And I think that this illustrates how your test goes wrong. For instance, I find overall utility to be the thing I feel I should maximize. I don't need any extra property where I observe that it's morally correct as well and I think my ideal self would perfectly agree. But none of that means that someone who wanted to minimize utility and felt that was motivating is in any way making a mistake of fact. I'd obviously see them as horrible and try to stop them but that doesn't mean they've gotten anything wrong.
"Watching would-be Ubermenschian conservatives thump their chests about how it’s good the strong dominate the weak has sapped my confidence in ethical convergence tbqh. The starting principles seem quite different."
I can understand why you would feel that way, but I'm not sure if those conservatives do actually undermine the truth of practical moral realism: it seems to me that they are not so much asserting that it is morally good that the strong dominate the weak, but rather that they do not care about moral principles, that they reject moral reasoning for what they assert.
I think what's going on is more like that point in a marital fight where you are so hurt and upset you are willing to say whatever to avoid giving them a victory.
It's less that conservatives are rejecting morality but they feel -- like the unsophisticated theist defending themselves from the someone like Dawkins -- that this kind of talk and discussion is being used to screw them over and they realize they lack the resources to respond in kind. And that can often be the case. I remember in highschool courses feeling that certain subjects/concepts were being presented in a biased and unfair manner and you can get that sense long before you can articulate what is actually going on.
I'm not saying it's a good thing but it's understandable.