I think this is an interesting start for investigation. You have described how one can move from a value system to a "neighboring" one; in your case, a system that has a lot of overlap with the one you started with. This misses out, though, I think on a more radical phenomenon that happens all the time: people moving from value systems to ones completely opposite, or at least orthogonal. One of the things Nietzsche attempts is an undermining of the Christian/slave morality, and replacing it with his very different idea of "aristocratic" or Homeric values. Given his immense influence, he managed to deliver that emotional shock and re-orientation of value to many people. We can look into other moments of history like the sixties, for instance, where some sections of society re-oriented their values into sometimes opposing values. Or we can even go to the Christian movement itself that re-oriented the Roman Empire. Now my question is, how is that possible? how does this process work?
1. Many apparent changes in values are really drastic changes in one's theory of how the world works, rather than values (though I think neatly classifying a lot of changes into one or the other is likely impossible.
2. Nietzsche is interested in selecting values aesthetically- so subjecting the ethical to the aesthetic. That's one way a big change in ethical values could come from outside the sphere of ethics. As a historical, I find prioritizing the aesthetic over the ethical very troubling- I agree with Walter Benjamin that it's a hallmark of fascism, and I think that this is one of the elements of Nietzsche's thoughts which is protofascist (though I don't think Nietzsche is, overall a protofascist).
3. I think the method I describe here, practical dominance, could potentially work in a very wide range of cases between quite disparate ethics. For example, Nietzsche himself sometimes makes gestures that even if you have a humanitarian/Christian outlook, modern conditions may require changing that outlook, or facing what would be, even in the terms of that outlook- a disaster. Even in quite drastic changes, a changing world might require such leaps.
4. Self-interest is another big one. Changing viewpoint so you can still hold yourself up as a "good" person, by redefining what good is.
> You might find that one system of values is very vulnerable to being rationalized- manipulated to get the result you want- due to the intricacy of its fine distinctions and casuistry
This has been a really, really important life change for me. Hard-and-fast moral systems are much easier to stick to than calculate-every-possible-factor systems, not least because of bias. A while ago, I noticed that whenever I made a tricky ethical decision (e.g. should I tell my friend's girlfriend that he is cheating on her), and used utilitarianism, I would end up wrong. Either because I made a factually incorrect prediction (e.g. "if I don't tell her, she won't find out") or because my estimates of the utility were wrong (e.g. "if she doesn't know, she'll be happier"), or because I steered my estimates to whichever action would be easier or better for me.
I've had the same feelings with regard to vegetarianism -- it's been easier to just have a simple rule that I follow consistently, rather than constantly trying to evaluate the harm of every meal offered at a restaurant.
There's a Terry Pratchett quote that really pushed me to this conclusion: "If you did it for a good reason, you’d do it for a bad one, and eventually, you wouldn't need a reason at all."
One thing I want to chuck in here is that a lot of philosophers are going to read your post- and possibly mine as well- and thing "oh, what he's talking about is really heuristic rules that he's adopted, not a fundamental change in value".
My response:
1. I don't really think human moral psychology works like that. The distinctions aren't so neat.
2. They eventually come to be ultimate values, even if they weren't straight up.
3. Even if Adam is only committed to them as heuristics, you can imagine a case of a person who genuinely committed to them, so they wouldn't be tempted to suspend the heuristic.
I think this is an interesting start for investigation. You have described how one can move from a value system to a "neighboring" one; in your case, a system that has a lot of overlap with the one you started with. This misses out, though, I think on a more radical phenomenon that happens all the time: people moving from value systems to ones completely opposite, or at least orthogonal. One of the things Nietzsche attempts is an undermining of the Christian/slave morality, and replacing it with his very different idea of "aristocratic" or Homeric values. Given his immense influence, he managed to deliver that emotional shock and re-orientation of value to many people. We can look into other moments of history like the sixties, for instance, where some sections of society re-oriented their values into sometimes opposing values. Or we can even go to the Christian movement itself that re-oriented the Roman Empire. Now my question is, how is that possible? how does this process work?
I think there are a number of answers:
1. Many apparent changes in values are really drastic changes in one's theory of how the world works, rather than values (though I think neatly classifying a lot of changes into one or the other is likely impossible.
2. Nietzsche is interested in selecting values aesthetically- so subjecting the ethical to the aesthetic. That's one way a big change in ethical values could come from outside the sphere of ethics. As a historical, I find prioritizing the aesthetic over the ethical very troubling- I agree with Walter Benjamin that it's a hallmark of fascism, and I think that this is one of the elements of Nietzsche's thoughts which is protofascist (though I don't think Nietzsche is, overall a protofascist).
3. I think the method I describe here, practical dominance, could potentially work in a very wide range of cases between quite disparate ethics. For example, Nietzsche himself sometimes makes gestures that even if you have a humanitarian/Christian outlook, modern conditions may require changing that outlook, or facing what would be, even in the terms of that outlook- a disaster. Even in quite drastic changes, a changing world might require such leaps.
4. Self-interest is another big one. Changing viewpoint so you can still hold yourself up as a "good" person, by redefining what good is.
> You might find that one system of values is very vulnerable to being rationalized- manipulated to get the result you want- due to the intricacy of its fine distinctions and casuistry
This has been a really, really important life change for me. Hard-and-fast moral systems are much easier to stick to than calculate-every-possible-factor systems, not least because of bias. A while ago, I noticed that whenever I made a tricky ethical decision (e.g. should I tell my friend's girlfriend that he is cheating on her), and used utilitarianism, I would end up wrong. Either because I made a factually incorrect prediction (e.g. "if I don't tell her, she won't find out") or because my estimates of the utility were wrong (e.g. "if she doesn't know, she'll be happier"), or because I steered my estimates to whichever action would be easier or better for me.
I've had the same feelings with regard to vegetarianism -- it's been easier to just have a simple rule that I follow consistently, rather than constantly trying to evaluate the harm of every meal offered at a restaurant.
There's a Terry Pratchett quote that really pushed me to this conclusion: "If you did it for a good reason, you’d do it for a bad one, and eventually, you wouldn't need a reason at all."
Great comment
One thing I want to chuck in here is that a lot of philosophers are going to read your post- and possibly mine as well- and thing "oh, what he's talking about is really heuristic rules that he's adopted, not a fundamental change in value".
My response:
1. I don't really think human moral psychology works like that. The distinctions aren't so neat.
2. They eventually come to be ultimate values, even if they weren't straight up.
3. Even if Adam is only committed to them as heuristics, you can imagine a case of a person who genuinely committed to them, so they wouldn't be tempted to suspend the heuristic.
"Much to Kieran's dismay" ... Who is Kieran?
My best friend and a staunch utilitarian moral realist.
A reader of the blog.