I have never heard an in-depth discussion by a normative ethicist about the relationship between ethical and political beliefs. I mean this in a somewhat special sense. Obviously, I have heard people argue that certain ethical commitments imply certain political commitments and vice versa, but I’ve never heard a philosopher discuss the obvious point that, empirically, there is massive covariance between political and ethical views, and maybe this should inform our philosophical thinking about both politics and ethics. I am sure such discussions exist, (e.g., some philosopher somewhere has to have written a paper on Haidt’s stuff) but I think that my experiences suggest they are not especially common. Why?
I do think you may be wrongly implying that consequentialism and Nietzschean selfishness are the only options. I'm thinking of how an extremely kind, compassionate, and thoughtful Christian online friend of mine would answer these questions. He fully accepts the Christian ideal of universal love--he's the furthest thing in the world from a Nietzschean--but is aggressively anti-consequentialist in his moral views.
For 1), he would absolutely *not* press the button to kill ten other children to save his own--since killing innocent people would be inherently, deontologically evil, even if for an altruistic cause. (Unlike a consequentialist, though, he'd be equally unwilling to kill *one* innocent person to save ten others.)
For 2), I know for a fact that he *would* choose to save his own loved one over the life-saving scientist. Indeed, he'd go further than this--he once told me that he would choose to save his own child over some large number (I don't remember which one) of other innocent children, if he was forced to choose. He said that this would be the objectively morally correct thing to do, not because his own children were inherently more valuable, but because we have special moral obligations to those close to us. But, as an deontologist, he makes a fundental moral distinction between merely *not helping* and actively *harming*.
For 3), I *don't* think he would choose to save a smaller number of his own fellow-citizens rather than a larger number of foreigners, since he's generally negative about nationalism--but I'm less sure about this than the other questions.
For 4), he would *definitely* choose to have a much-larger sum spent aiding the starving than given to himself. This question almost seems too easy--it's a pure issue of selfishness, not the more challenging one of 'groupishness', of special moral obligations to those close to you. Asking if people would prefer a smaller sum be given to the poor *in their own community* rather than a larger sum to those in greater need abroad would be a better way of getting at the difference in moral intuitions here.
Haidt is a bad faith actor, the kind referred to on the Internet as a "concern troll". He presents as a liberal, but his aim is to normalize bad behavior by conservatives. Pre-Trump, this was done by positing a concern for decency and legitimate authority, now it's more about in-group loyalty
Ethical beliefs are totally interlinked with political beliefs, with that I agree.
But you will need to explain to a greater degree by what you are referring to as "consequentialism." I would the consequences of events do lead to political/ethical leanings, but that those beliefs, dependent on circumstances can lead to polar differences that create most of the political disharmony (compounded by the factors of learning (which is frequently contrary to what one has been taught and contingent on perception of one's social acceptance and actual social position accepted by outsiders and placed upon the individual.) I am now going to have to attempt to find you mean by philosophical consequentialism.
The conflict-theoretical framing is clearly correct for something like abortion, where it's a straightforward fundamental values difference. Probably also for trans issues, where dislike of them seems to mostly come down to aesthetic preference. But for something like gun regulations or environmentalism, that seems like a situation where mistake-theory is better. Everyone wants our society to be safe, clean, and sustainable, they just disagree on whether guns and fossil fuels are an effective means to that end.
Re 2: I wonder whether this view is ALSO politically polarized. It's literally just Schmitt's friend–enemy distinction, so I would be astonished if people "on the right" didn't grasp it, and believed those on the left fundamentally wanted the same things.
6. What I did with that information when I learned it is stopped being a Effective Altruist (if I ever was one in the first place, which in retrospect is dubious).
People find conflict theory nasty because it encourages us to indulge in our tribal instincts. If you view someone disagreeing with you not as a person who has reached a different conclusion, but an enemy, you have much less of an incentive to consider if what they are saying is true. You, author, might be intelligent and wise enough to have a fleshed-out and defensible worldview/philosophy, but others very rarely do, and it is largely to their benefit to not view differing viewpoints as hostile by nature.
There's an important distinction between personal and political ethics. As an example, it's generally considered morally obligatory to take care of one's immediate family, even if others might benefit more from your help. By contrast, doing the same thing in politics is nepotism.
If you combine consequentialism with valuing people equally, you naturally reach egalitarian conclusions, which don't arise with most other political/ethical frameworks
This is an interesting question!
I do think you may be wrongly implying that consequentialism and Nietzschean selfishness are the only options. I'm thinking of how an extremely kind, compassionate, and thoughtful Christian online friend of mine would answer these questions. He fully accepts the Christian ideal of universal love--he's the furthest thing in the world from a Nietzschean--but is aggressively anti-consequentialist in his moral views.
For 1), he would absolutely *not* press the button to kill ten other children to save his own--since killing innocent people would be inherently, deontologically evil, even if for an altruistic cause. (Unlike a consequentialist, though, he'd be equally unwilling to kill *one* innocent person to save ten others.)
For 2), I know for a fact that he *would* choose to save his own loved one over the life-saving scientist. Indeed, he'd go further than this--he once told me that he would choose to save his own child over some large number (I don't remember which one) of other innocent children, if he was forced to choose. He said that this would be the objectively morally correct thing to do, not because his own children were inherently more valuable, but because we have special moral obligations to those close to us. But, as an deontologist, he makes a fundental moral distinction between merely *not helping* and actively *harming*.
For 3), I *don't* think he would choose to save a smaller number of his own fellow-citizens rather than a larger number of foreigners, since he's generally negative about nationalism--but I'm less sure about this than the other questions.
For 4), he would *definitely* choose to have a much-larger sum spent aiding the starving than given to himself. This question almost seems too easy--it's a pure issue of selfishness, not the more challenging one of 'groupishness', of special moral obligations to those close to you. Asking if people would prefer a smaller sum be given to the poor *in their own community* rather than a larger sum to those in greater need abroad would be a better way of getting at the difference in moral intuitions here.
Haidt is a bad faith actor, the kind referred to on the Internet as a "concern troll". He presents as a liberal, but his aim is to normalize bad behavior by conservatives. Pre-Trump, this was done by positing a concern for decency and legitimate authority, now it's more about in-group loyalty
Ethical beliefs are totally interlinked with political beliefs, with that I agree.
But you will need to explain to a greater degree by what you are referring to as "consequentialism." I would the consequences of events do lead to political/ethical leanings, but that those beliefs, dependent on circumstances can lead to polar differences that create most of the political disharmony (compounded by the factors of learning (which is frequently contrary to what one has been taught and contingent on perception of one's social acceptance and actual social position accepted by outsiders and placed upon the individual.) I am now going to have to attempt to find you mean by philosophical consequentialism.
The conflict-theoretical framing is clearly correct for something like abortion, where it's a straightforward fundamental values difference. Probably also for trans issues, where dislike of them seems to mostly come down to aesthetic preference. But for something like gun regulations or environmentalism, that seems like a situation where mistake-theory is better. Everyone wants our society to be safe, clean, and sustainable, they just disagree on whether guns and fossil fuels are an effective means to that end.
Re 2: I wonder whether this view is ALSO politically polarized. It's literally just Schmitt's friend–enemy distinction, so I would be astonished if people "on the right" didn't grasp it, and believed those on the left fundamentally wanted the same things.
6. What I did with that information when I learned it is stopped being a Effective Altruist (if I ever was one in the first place, which in retrospect is dubious).
People find conflict theory nasty because it encourages us to indulge in our tribal instincts. If you view someone disagreeing with you not as a person who has reached a different conclusion, but an enemy, you have much less of an incentive to consider if what they are saying is true. You, author, might be intelligent and wise enough to have a fleshed-out and defensible worldview/philosophy, but others very rarely do, and it is largely to their benefit to not view differing viewpoints as hostile by nature.
Related: the slatestarcodex post “Axiology, Morality, Law” on the connections between the moral (and axiological) and the political.
https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/08/28/contra-askell-on-moral-offsets/
There's an important distinction between personal and political ethics. As an example, it's generally considered morally obligatory to take care of one's immediate family, even if others might benefit more from your help. By contrast, doing the same thing in politics is nepotism.
If you combine consequentialism with valuing people equally, you naturally reach egalitarian conclusions, which don't arise with most other political/ethical frameworks